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More than 150,000 deaths are now attributed to the global COVID-19 
pandemic. Many thousands more lives are expected to be lost before 
we have brought the disease under control and are capable of managing 
future spikes in the number of cases. In an effort to both slow and stop the 
disease, communities across the world have halted everyday life, requesting 
or requiring their residents to close non-essential businesses, stop going 
to school, and stay home. Digital initiatives hope to support safe and well-
considered approaches to the reopening of our societies while simultaneously 
reducing the human loss of life by giving frontline officials modern tools with 
which to control this pandemic.
One particular set of modern digital tools aims to upgrade contact-tracing 
capacity, typically a lengthy and laborious process. In addition to increasing 
the speed with which contact-tracers can reach those who have been 
exposed to the disease, these tools can increase the accuracy of contact 
tracing. However, many first-generation digital contact-tracing tools have 
paved the way for a post-pandemic surveillance state and the mistreatment 
of private, personal information. Privacy must remain at the forefront of the 
global response, lest short-term pandemic interventions enable long-term 
surveillance and abuse. The design and development of the next generation 
of contact-tracing tools offers an opportunity to sharply pivot to solutions 
using privacy-first principles and collaborative, open-source designs. 
These tools present an opportunity to save lives by flattening the curve 
of the pandemic and to provide economic relief without allowing privacy 
infringements now or in the future. 
The COVID-19 Pandemic Challenge
COVID-19 virus transmission occurs for several days before a person shows any symptoms. During 
this time, a person going about their daily life may interact with, and possibly pass the infection to, 
as many as a thousand people. Without knowing they are infected, an individual who has only mild 
symptoms or is asymptomatic may continue to interact with others, further spreading the virus. This 
creates an exponential rise in infections.
Stopping the spread of COVID-19 with pharmaceutical treatments and vaccines remains at least 
6–18 months away from widespread availability. Therefore, public health countermeasures, such 
as social distancing, offer the only possibility of stopping virus proliferation in the near future. When 
applied broadly, such measures disrupt every aspect of society and risk economic collapse. Already, 
unemployment rates have skyrocketed, tenants are struggling to pay rent, and critical supply chains, 
including the food supply chain, have been interrupted. The longer strict social distancing measures 
remain in place, the more severe the consequences for economies and societies will be. However, 
if social distancing measures are lifted too quickly, the virus will spread once again, claiming many 
additional lives.  
The Contact-Tracing App As A Solution
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The contact-tracing process evaluates the 
recent location history and social connections 
of those who become infected and notifies 
the people they have interacted with of their 
exposure to the virus. In this way, contact-
tracing methods allow targeted measures (e.g., 
quarantining, virus testing) to be applied only to 
exposed individuals. Traditionally, public health 
officials perform contact tracing manually, by 
interviewing patients diagnosed with a disease 
about their activity over the past days or 
weeks. Then, officials reach out to people who 
crossed paths with the patient during the time 
the patient was contagious and recommend 
targeted interventions to prevent further spread 
of the disease.
Widespread, rapid transmission of a virus by 
respiratory droplets, as in the case of COVID-19, 
challenges the practicality of the traditional 
contact-tracing process.  Manual tracing is 
resource intensive, is time consuming, and will, 
at best, be limited to contacts within the social 
circles of the infected—and thus cannot trace 
strangers effectively.  Furthermore, the patient 
being interviewed is often extremely ill and at 
risk for memory errors during the interview.  
Digital contact-tracing tools may help mitigate 
these challenges. 
The Contact-Tracing 
App As A Solution
Today, almost half of the world’s population 
carries a device, such as a smartphone, capable 
of GPS tracking and Bluetooth communication 
with nearby devices. Each device is able to 
create a location trail—a timestamped log of 
the locations of an individual, as well as a list of 
anonymous ID tokens that are collected when 
the device user crosses near another device. By 
comparing the device users’ location trails or the 
anonymous ID tokens they have collected with 
those from people who have COVID-19, one can 
identify others who have been near the person 
who is infected; this facilitates contact tracing 
in a more accurate and timely manner than 
the traditional manual approach. Several pilot 
programs, particularly in China and South Korea, 
have demonstrated the technical feasibility of 
contact-tracing applications as tools to help 
contain the COVID-19 outbreak within a large 
population. However, these programs also 
highlight the very real risks that exist with the 
use of such technologies.
A location trail and list of nearby device IDs 
contains highly sensitive, private information 
about a person: everything from where they live 
and work and which businesses they support, 
to which friends and family members they visit. 
Location data can be used to identify people 
who are infected and might then be targeted 
by their community. For example, data sent 
out by the South Korean government to inform 
residents about the movements of persons 
recently diagnosed with COVID-19 sparked 
speculations about the individuals’ personal 
lives, from rumors of plastic surgery to infidelity 
and prostitution. More frightening still, enabling 
access to a person’s location data by a third 
party, particularly a government, opens a path 
to potentially unrestrained state surveillance. 
In China, users suspect that an app developed 
to help citizens identify symptoms and their risk 
of carrying a pathogen was used to spy on them 
and share personal data with the police. Care 
must be taken in the design of such apps.
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The Contact-Tracing App as a Solution
A number of groups, from governments to 
non-profits, have quickly acted to innovate the 
contact-tracing process: they are designing, 
building, and launching contact-tracing apps 
in response to the COVID-19 crisis. A diverse 
range of approaches exist, creating challenging 
choices for officials looking to implement 
contact-tracing technology in their community 
and raising concerns about these choices 
among citizens asked to participate in contact 
tracing. We are frequently asked how to 
evaluate and differentiate between the options 
for contact-tracing applications. Here, we share 
the questions we ask about app features and 
plans when reviewing the many contact-tracing 
apps appearing on the global stage.  
[Some of my patients] 
were more afraid of 
being blamed than dying 
of the virus”
Examples of the messages that alert  
South Koreans to new cases
“
— Lee Su-young, Psychiatrist at   
Myongji Hospital, South Korea
Contact-Tracing Apps Around the Globe
8
Contact-Tracing 
Apps Around  
The Globe
Contact-Tracing Apps Around the Globe
09
Additional proposed apps beyond this list may exist.  All 
apps listed are not necessarily available in Apple iOS store 
and Google Playstore at this time.  As part of this paper, we 
have begun to seek answers to the questions that follow 
for each of these apps.  These answers are being gathered 
into a table; the working draft can be found here:
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/tracing_apps_table
We invite readers to submit additions and suggestions  
to the table at  info@pathcheck.org
North America
USA
COVID Safe Paths
CoEpi
Covid Watch
South America
Peru
PeruEnTusManos (“Peru in Your Hands”)
Asia
Singapore
TraceTogether
South Korea
Corona 100m (Co100)
China
Alipay Health Code, WeChat, QQ
India
Aarogya Setu  
Tracy
Europe
UK
Covid Symptom Tracker
France
StopCovid
Poland
ProteGO
Iceland
Rakning C-19
Croatia
STOP Corona!
Austria
Stopp Corona
Middle East
Israel 
HaMagen
Track Virus
Bahrain 
BeAware Bahrain
Africa
South Africa
Covi-ID
PCI is not responsible for any errors or omissions, 
or for the results obtained from the use of this 
information. All information in this report is 
provided “as is”, with no guarantee of completeness, 
accuracy, timeliness or of the results obtained from 
the use of this information. We welcome additions, 
modifications, and corrections. Please reach out to us 
at info@pathcheck.org with additions, modifications, 
and corrections.
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Is The Project Open Source? 
An open-source approach lets programmers and other experts outside the app 
development team review the code for a project. These outside programmers 
can make improvements, copy the code, or use it to create something entirely 
new. Open source offers a layer of trustworthiness. Because the code is 
publicly available, it can be reviewed by experts around the world to confirm 
it works the way the development team says it should. There are, at times, 
valid reasons to not use an open-source approach, such as when a business is 
seeking to develop a proprietary technology. 
During the COVID-19 crisis, we believe that open-source projects promote 
collaboration and foster community.  
The Questions We Are Asking
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Does the App Use GPS, Bluetooth, or Both?
Contact-tracing apps require the use of a data source to infer contact between two people: two of the most 
useful data sources are GPS location data and Bluetooth broadcasting. GPS-based apps create a “location 
trail” for each user by recording their time-stamped GPS location. If a person catches COVID-19, they can 
share their location trail with the responsible authority—the health worker, public health official, government 
official, or app creator. The authority then releases some or all of the location trail for other users to compare 
to. In some applications, the person who is infected might be able to directly share their location trail with 
other users.  
Other apps rely on Bluetooth to determine who the person who is infected has crossed paths. Such apps 
create a unique identifier, a number or token, which the app broadcasts to nearby devices. The user’s phone 
then records the identifiers of other phones it has been near. If a person becomes infected, their unique 
identifiers can be compared to those stored by other users to determine who the infected person has crossed 
paths with. In some cases, such as the Singapore TraceTogether app, the central authority stores user 
information and can determine the user’s phone number and identity from an identifier.  In others, such as 
COVID Watch and CoEpi, the identifiers provided by the person who declares themselves to be infected cannot 
be used by the central authority to determine the person’s real world identity.
Both approaches offer distinct advantages and challenges:
GPS-Based Approach
• Allows for estimation of exposure related to surface 
transmission of disease. Unlike Bluetooth, GPS-based 
systems can notify users if they were in a location 
shortly after a person infected with COVID-19, 
when the chance for exposure to the virus through 
commonly touched surfaces is high. 
• Enables users to import historical data. Other 
applications on the users’ phones, such as Google 
Maps, are already collecting the potential user’s 
location histories before they install the contact-
tracing app.  When users import these historical  
data, the app can alert the user to potential exposures 
from their location history, even before they 
downloaded the app. 
• Provides redacted, anonymized GPS data to help 
public health officials follow the spread of disease 
within a community. 
• Is able to record the user’s location history using 
a small amount of data, making scaling and 
implementation in regions with high data costs  
more likely.
Bluetooth-Based Approach
• Uses signal strength, which is reduced by walls and 
other barriers, to estimate the distance between users. 
In some places, such as a large, multi-floor building, 
this estimate more accurately reflects the chance of 
exposure to disease than a GPS-based approach.   
• Uses time-range-dependent, randomly generated 
numbers as IDs to ideally achieve relative anonymity.  
• Requires the use of a compatible app by other users 
to record possible exposures. If an app is not widely 
adopted, the potential utility is limited.  
• No potential to collect historical data from before the 
user downloaded the app.
The Questions We Are Asking
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In the near-future, some solutions, including 
COVID Safe Paths, will integrate both 
approaches, allowing the user to harness the 
advantages of each while mitigating  
some challenges.
GPS: HaMagen (Israel)
Both GPS and Bluetooth: Aarogya Setu (India)
Bluetooth: Trace Together (Singapore)
Fixed vs. Time-Variable Identifiers
Some Bluetooth-based apps use a fixed 
identifier, meaning the unique number 
assigned to the device does not change and 
is permanently associated with the user. 
Time-variable identifiers change on a set 
time interval, such as an hour, so each user 
is associated with many different identifiers. 
The use of time-variable identifiers adds 
a layer of privacy protection by making it 
difficult for a third party to track a particular 
phone over time based upon  
a single identifier. 
The Questions We Are Asking
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Are Location And Contact Data Stored And Processed In A Centralized Or 
Decentralized Manner?
In a centralized version of contact tracing, location and contact data are collected and consolidated centrally 
by a single authority, often a government entity. China utilized a centralized approach with its app. Other 
information about the user, such as mobile telecommunication service provider or payment data, may be 
collected and paired with the location data.  
The central authority identifies people who are infected, determines their contacts, and requests specific 
actions by those who may have been exposed to the virus. Centralized systems create powerful tools for 
analysis and public health decision making. However, such systems also expose a person’s data to a central 
authority, creating an opportunity to undermine the person’s privacy.   
In a decentralized approach, the healthy user’s data never goes to a central server. Location data are stored 
and processed on the phone of the user. Only the location data of people confirmed to be infected need to 
be shared. Tools, such as redaction and blurring of the infected person’s data, can be used to help preserve 
their privacy. An Israeli app, Track Virus, is an example of a decentralized approach, as is COVID Safe Paths. 
Decentralized systems typically offer greater privacy protection and are, therefore, more in line with privacy 
requirements and regulations such as GDPR. Some utility may be lost compared to centralized systems as 
collection and aggregation of large data sets from users can be used for beneficial public health research. 
However, as we consider the various approaches, the grave privacy risks associated with centralized systems 
far outweigh the limited additional benefits, leading us to highly value decentralized approaches.
A Push or a Pull?
When checking if a healthy user has been 
exposed to COVID-19, contact-tracing apps 
may either push the healthy user’s data to 
the authority (centralized processing) or pull 
a list of locations and/or contact IDs of those 
who have been infected from the authority 
(decentralized processing). With a push,  
the healthy user’s data is pushed (shared) 
off of the user’s device and is compared by 
the authority to the data of people who have 
been infected. This exposes a large amount 
of data to the authority. In a pull model, 
an anonymized history of location data or 
identifiers from people who have been infected 
are pulled onto the healthy user’s device  
so that the comparison can take place locally 
without compromising the privacy of  
healthy individuals.
A previous version of this report incorrectly described 
Track Virus.  Track Virus is a live platform with 
increasing use.  It utilizes a decentralized approach to 
processing and storing data in order to preserve user 
privacy.  More can be learned about Track Virus here:
https://www.track-virus.com/
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Potential Exposures to COVID-19 
Given what is known to date about person-to-person transmission of COVID-19, contact-tracing apps can 
properly assess users’ potential exposure to the virus if they take four important factors into consideration: 
• The distance between the person who is infected and the user.  
• The length of time the person who is infected and the user occupied the same space.  
• How many days prior to becoming infected the person interacted with the user.  
• Whether or not the user may have had contact with contaminated surfaces after interaction with the 
person who is infected.
How Is Data Collected From People Who Experience Symptoms 
Of COVID-19?
A location history must be collected from a person who has been diagnosed with COVID-19 in order for 
contact tracing to occur. Several approaches are being piloted. In general, these approaches fall into two 
categories:
• An authority (public health official, healthcare provider, government official) collects the location history 
from the person who is infected and makes it available to users of the app. 
• The patient self-reports symptoms and directly shares their data with other users of the app. 
Use of an authority offers the advantage of confirmation that the person has COVID-19. The overlap of 
symptoms between COVID-19 and other common respiratory illnesses might cause someone to suspect 
they have COVID-19 when they actually have the flu or a common cold. Systems where people self-report 
themselves as infected pose the risk that people with symptoms, but without a confirmed diagnosis, share 
their location trail. Self-reporting approaches are also at risk from bad actors who may misreport their status 
as infected in order to create chaos and fear. However, self-reporting systems have the advantage of fuller 
consent of the infected person as the person definitively decides to share their location trail without influence 
from an authority figure. When evaluating contact-tracing solutions, we seek to understand how data  
will be collected from the person who is infected and how the solution will confirm that the person truly  
has COVID-19.
How Does the App Decide Which People Could Have Been Exposed To Others 
Infected With COVID-19?
At the base of every contact-tracing app lies an algorithm that determines whether the app user has been 
exposed to people who are infected and might have an increased chance of being infected themselves. The 
algorithm integrates many factors, such as the distance between the users, the length of time the users were 
in the same location, or the amount of time between the contact and the start of symptoms. Two apps with 
different algorithms will potentially give a different likelihood of exposure to the same user. Understanding 
the algorithm used is necessary for public health officials and healthcare providers to provide appropriate 
guidance to users who receive an exposure notification. Contact-tracing app developers must clearly 
communicate their algorithm with all stakeholders and failure to do so will be a significant red flag.
The Questions We Are Asking
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Will The Data Be Used For Other Purposes Besides  
Contact Tracing?
Location data may potentially be repurposed to achieve additional objectives 
beyond contact tracing. We believe these data should be used only for 
response to an ongoing pandemic and that other uses should be strictly 
forbidden. Turning app data over to law enforcement or other non-health 
actors, such as commercial entities seeking to target ads to potential 
customers, threatens users’ rights and privacy. Critically, this undermines 
public trust. Without trust, citizens will not adopt contact-tracing apps at a 
wide enough scale to effectively control the spread of the epidemic. Therefore, 
access to location-tracking data should be tightly limited to specific public 
health initiatives working on pandemic response. 
How Do Users Know The Data Is Not Used For  
Other Purposes? 
Users should be able to confirm how their data is used. Promises by the app’s 
developers to delete data are insufficient. Users should be able to check 
exactly what location data has been collected and stored and to confirm that 
their data is no longer there after the deadline for deletion (the disease’s 
incubation period, 14 to 37 days for coronavirus). Apps must obtain users’ 
unforced and informed consent for any disclosure of their data. 
Recently, the A1 Teleom Austria Group shared aggregated user 
location data from an app not regularly used for public health 
purposes with the Austrian government’s COVID-19 emergency 
management team for reasons that were not initially specified. 
Observers believe that A1’s data was most likely being used to 
forecast disease spread or to monitor the population for large 
gatherings that might transmit the virus. However, the sharing of 
location data with government agencies for unspecified purposes 
attracted the criticism of privacy rights activists and created 
suspicions that weakened user trust, threatening long-term 
success.   
The Questions We Are Asking
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How Is The Privacy Of Healthy Users Protected?
An opportunity for misuse and privacy violations arises whenever a third party, a government, a 
corporation, or any other entity is able to access the data of healthy users. A decentralized approach 
prevents privacy compromise for healthy users because they are doing all the calculations on their 
own phones. Time-limited storage of location data also protects user privacy, such as only storing 
28 days of data with deletion of everything beyond this point. All contact-tracing app development 
teams should clearly articulate how they protect the privacy of all users – whether healthy or 
infected. As an example, a preliminary draft of the privacy principles of the COVID Safe Paths team 
can be accessed in COVID-19 Contact Tracing Privacy Principles. This overview of model privacy 
practices explains how the application embraces principles such as Privacy by Design, the Fair 
Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), and Legal Protection by Design. 
How Is The Privacy Of Users Who Have Been Infected  
With COVID-19 Protected? 
Historical location data and nearby device IDs must be collected from a person who is infected to 
enable contact tracing. However, both the collection and release of that information have broad 
implications for the privacy rights of the individual. As the most vulnerable stakeholder, several 
efforts must be undertaken to protect, to the highest degree possible, the privacy of the person who 
is infected. 
App development teams may design for privacy by utilizing a variety of approaches:
• Providing users with the ability to correct 
incorrect information. 
• Notifying individuals about what data is 
collected, how long it is stored, and who will 
have access to it during each stage of use. 
• Enabling people to obtain access to 
information about potential exposures 
to COVID-19 without requiring that they 
consent to share their data with  
other parties. 
• Deleting user location data after it is no 
longer necessary to perform contact tracing. 
 
• Alignment with the Fair Information Practice 
Principles. 
• Using open-source software  to foster trust 
in the app’s privacy protection claims.
• Limiting the amount of data published publicly. 
• Providing tools that allow the person who has 
been diagnosed and their healthcare providers 
to redact any sensitive locations, such as a 
home or workplace. 
• End-to-end encryption of location data before 
sensitive locations are redacted. 
• Eliminating the risk of third-party access 
to information by enabling voluntary self-
reporting by the person who is infected. 
• Supporting strict regulation around access 
to and usage of the data by any entity that 
collects it, particularly governments. 
• Obtaining targeted, affirmative, informed 
consent for each use of the person’s data. 
• Providing users with the ability to see how 
their data is being used and revoke consent for 
usage of their information.
The Questions We Are Asking
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Are People Who Are Infected With COVID-19 Forced To Share Their  
Location History?
Requiring people who are infected or potentially infected to track their movements and 
disclose their contacts achieves the highest degree of efficacy in contact tracing within 
a community. However, if residents cannot choose to at least selectively withhold their 
information, they may be stigmatized, persecuted, or exploited by malicious actors 
on the basis of their data.  Voluntary reporting respects users’ rights to privacy and to 
informed consent. It encourages app developers to include safeguards that reduce the 
risk for abuse of sensitive data. However, when individuals who become infected refuse 
to share their contact-tracing data, the accuracy of contact tracing declines, potentially 
contributing to misinformation and a false sense of security.
We believe that no one should be forced to relinquish highly sensitive personal data. We 
dislike solutions that require potential users to consent to share their data if they become 
infected in order to access information about whether or not they have crossed paths with 
someone who was infected.  Incentives such as those outlined in the following sections 
should be implemented to encourage users who become infected to share their data. 
Are Healthy People Required To Use  
The App?
People who are healthy should also proactively choose 
to use a contact-tracing app rather than being mandated 
to do so. Potential users should be encouraged to do so 
by incentives, such as the opportunity to take control of 
their information to benefit their health, strong privacy 
protection policies, trust in the app’s developers, clear 
communication, and informed consent.  
“Alipay Health Code (China): An example of 
a contact-tracing approach with mandatory 
participation tied to freedom of movement
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/
business/china-coronavirus-surveillance.html
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19
Who Is Supporting The App?
In order to roll out a contact-tracing app on a global scale, three groups must 
work together: a substantial team to create and promote the app; large, trusted 
institutions to support development and deployment of the app; and local, on-
the-ground partners in the various communities in which the app is deployed. 
Contact-tracing apps are tools, not complete solutions.  Disease containment 
utilizing these tools requires multidisciplinary collaborations across the 
technology, healthcare, public health, and government sectors.  
We are working hard to create these partnerships for COVID Safe Paths and 
look for such partnerships in other apps we evaluate.
Among those partnerships teams should be seeking to build are: 
• Cloud players (AWS, Azure, GCP, etc.) 
• Mobile carriers and local telecommunications providers. 
• Partnerships with health authorities; these partnerships are particularly 
important in light of app store requirements for all apps addressing the 
COVID-19 pandemic to have the support of a health organization 
• Government agencies 
• Local public health workers and healthcare providers: contact-tracing apps 
will only succeed if those who crossed paths with someone who became 
infected can receive guidance and support from local providers on what 
steps to take to protect themselves and their families.  
• Current contact tracers; integrating into the current contact-tracing 
protocol increases the effectiveness of a contact-tracing app within  
a community 
• Non-profit organizations and academic institutions
The Questions We Are Asking
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How Will The App Be Deployed? 
We see apps aiming to deploy at a variety of levels, from a single city to an entire nation 
to those aiming for a global reach. Regardless of the level at which they are deployed, 
contact-tracing apps must be paired with existing infrastructure in order to support a 
successful containment strategy. Public health officials and healthcare providers must 
be ready to answer user questions, offer testing, or provide advice about what to do if 
someone has been exposed to a person with COVID-19.  The resources and support 
necessary to follow this advice must also be made available. We look for well-considered 
deployment strategies with aggressive outreach to local partners.  For this reason, we are 
building not only a contact-tracing app, but also Safe Places, a web-based tool for public 
health officials working to contain the COVID-19 pandemic. 
It is also worth noting that as global travel resumes, cross-communication between 
apps operating in different regions will be necessary to achieve global containment of 
COVID-19. We look for teams that are thinking ahead and building the technological 
foundation for this collaboration into their application.  
What Steps Are Being Taken To Address Challenges In Scaling 
The Solution?
Taking any software tool from idea to widespread solution requires the team to think 
creatively. Contact-tracing apps gain value with each additional user. Many approaches to 
encouraging user adoption exist, and good teams will use a variety of them. A few steps 
we encourage are:  
• Fostering trust 
• Developing key partnerships, including with community officials who can help drive 
local support for the solution 
• Creating solutions that meet the needs of public health officials responding to the 
pandemic 
• Focusing on the needs of the users 
• Providing value to the user during a contact-tracing interview even if they choose not 
to download the app before they have been diagnosed with COVID-19
The Questions We Are Asking
21
What Incentives Are In Place To Promote Deployment And Adoption? 
Contact-tracing apps need a strong value proposition for each stakeholder—the healthy 
user, the person who is infected, the public health worker responsible for contact tracing, 
the public health authority responsible for the community’s response to the pandemic, 
and government officials tasked with coordinating the local or national response to 
COVID-19. As an example, the incentives for each stakeholder from the Safe Paths 
solution are presented here.
Healthy Users: The General Population
Offers an opportunity to take control and gain information. The user is able to make 
decisions about where they should be going and what activities are safe for their families 
and themselves. Users are more confident and more informed about their actual risk of 
spreading the disease. 
Person with COVID-19
Gives the ability to quickly and accurately share location history with public health contact 
tracers. Sharing their history offers an opportunity to help protect their community.  
Contact Tracers
Gives immediate relief to contact tracers. Provides a tool to more efficiently conduct 
interviews and gather information from patients. Increases data accuracy over current 
methods (e.g., remembering). Enables them to work with infected patients to quickly 
remove information that the patient asserts is personal, private, and/or confidential.
Public Health Authorities
Allows more efficient and more accurate data collection and analysis about the spread 
of COVID-19 within their jurisdiction. Provides data to make better, more targeted 
recommendations for intervention to their community and to utilize limited testing 
resources most constructively. Offers an opportunity to communicate a personalized risk 
profile to each citizen, answering the question “Should I be concerned or not?” for every 
individual in their constituency and to closely monitor those who have the highest chance 
of experiencing complications from COVID-19.
Government Officials
Faster and more accurate contact tracing allows officials to catch up with the virus and 
more effectively deploy resources. Rather than undifferentiated application of lock-
down measures risking economic and subsequent financial collapse, officials are able to 
implement a differentiated approach with targeted measures as recommended by the 
WHO.
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What Does User Notification Of A Potential Exposure To COVID-19 
Look Like? 
The utmost care must be taken when notifying users of a potential exposure to COVID-19 
given the serious health, economic, and social consequences of a notification.  During 
this stressful time, clear, easy-to-understand communication reduces the possibility for 
the user to misjudge their situation. High-quality translations should be available for all 
users.   Transparency about how the decision to notify the user was made helps the user 
and their public health officials make decisions about whether and which containment 
measures the user needs to undertake.  Notifications should evolve to reflect advances 
in the understanding of disease transmission as scientists around the world continue to 
clarify how COVID-19 passes from person to person.
How Does the App Prevent Fraudulent Reports? 
Contact-tracing apps, particularly those that allow individuals to self-report themselves 
as infected, must address the risk that some people will make fraudulent reports. In 
some instances, a false report may be done in good faith—the person truly suspects 
they have COVID-19, but they have not undergone definitive testing and actually have 
a different virus. In other cases, bad actors may report themselves as infected with 
COVID-19 in order to create chaos. Storing sensitive information in an anonymized, 
redacted, and aggregated manner minimizes the risk of data-tampering, yet it does not 
eliminate the chance for human error or malicious intervention. One approach to reducing 
fraud requires the diagnosis to be confirmed by a healthcare provider. However, creative 
teams may find other ways to prevent false reports of illness.
What Is The Policy For Correcting False Reports? 
With large-scale deployment, most apps will experience an occasional false report or 
find an error in an otherwise correct report.  Each app should develop a protocol for 
its response when an incorrect report is identified. Easy-to-use tools should allow all 
involved in reporting to quickly mark and remove errors as soon as the false report is 
identified.  Most often, users should be notified of the change in their exposure history.    
What Happens If Identifiable Information Is Accidentally Released? 
While most apps aim to obscure the identity of the person who is infected, accidental 
release of information sufficient to identify the person can occur on rare occasions, 
similar to accidental release of protected health information. These low risks should be 
communicated to the users during the consent process. A process for quickly removing 
identifiable information from public access should be in place.  
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How Does The App Address The Possibility Of Panic Or Risky 
Behavior Among Users? 
Notification of a potential exposure to COVID-19 will be frightening to many, particularly 
those at increased risk for serious complications, and may lead to panic among users. 
Large groups of people seeking medical evaluation or demanding testing could quickly 
overwhelm an already strained healthcare system. We have seen panic related to the 
pandemic lead to hoarding and vigilantism. Conversely, users who are not notified of 
a potential exposure may assume they are at no risk to catch COVID-19 and disregard 
critical social distancing and hygiene recommendations. Any contact-tracing solution will 
need to provide users with accurate information to reduce the chance for panic or risky 
behavior. When reviewing an app, we look for the following: 
• Clear, easy-to-understand, culturally appropriate communication with the user 
• Engagement of epidemiologists, public health officials, and healthcare providers, 
both as core members of the decision-making team and as local partners within 
the community to which the app is deployed, in order to provide assessment and 
recommendations to people who may have been exposed to COVID-19 
• Measures to prevent individuals from falsely reporting themselves infected and 
thoughtful consideration of how a person reported to be infected is confirmed to  
have COVID-19 
• Use of both GPS and Bluetooth systems, utilizing the strengths of each technology 
• Creative algorithms that reduce the chance that insignificant exposures are flagged
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What Relationships Does The Team Have With Epidemiologists And  
Health Officials? 
Contact-tracing apps should be viewed as a tool to be utilized by experts in infectious disease 
control. Epidemiologists, public health officials, and healthcare providers must be core members of 
any team designing and implementing a contact-tracing app. We look to see that such experts are 
included as team members, mentors, and strategic partners.   
How Does The Solution Interact With Public Health Officials?
Ideally, contact-tracing apps should fit into the current care pathway.  One of the leaders in this area 
is TraceTogether in Singapore, which supports a contact-tracing process put in place long before the 
app was ready. TraceTogether uses Bluetooth to identify nearby phones with the app installed and 
tracks both proximity and timestamps. If a person is diagnosed with COVID-19, they can choose to 
allow the Ministry of Health to access their TraceTogether data, which is then used by the manual 
contact-tracing team to alert those who may have been exposed. The manual contact-tracing team 
then alerts those who may have been exposed.
We also aim to lead in this area with the development of COVID Safe Places, a web-tool allowing 
public health officials to work more quickly, collect better data, and better respond to what is 
happening in their community. We are partnering with public health workers around the world to 
deploy COVID Safe Places.   
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How Will The Team Measure Its Impact On The Pandemic? 
The success of any contact-tracing program should be measured in lives saved. Lives are 
saved both by a reduction in the spread of disease and by a reduction in the psychosocial 
and economic consequences of widespread quarantine actions. Quantitative analysis 
of the effect of this new technology should be undertaken—not only to allow for further 
improvements during the current COVID-19 pandemic, but also to better address the next 
outbreak of infectious disease.   In addition to collecting real-world data about the impact 
of contact-tracing apps, teams should work to communicate their success to the public.  
If the apps are effective in helping to control the pandemic, the public may fail to notice 
the extent to which their use was critical to the community’s ability to control the spread 
of disease. 
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27
The COVID-19 pandemic will not last forever. If we falter in our 
response and choose digital contact-tracing tools that compromise 
individual privacy for efficacy, the consequences will extend long 
after the last store has reopened and the last child has returned to 
school.  We believe privacy does not have to be compromised in order 
to reduce new infections and slow the spread of disease.  We are 
building COVID Safe Paths with privacy protection at the forefront for 
this pandemic and the next.   Here, we have begun to detail the key 
questions that should be asked as we evaluate contact-tracing apps 
developed and deployed against the COVID-19 pandemic.  We plan to 
continue this discussion and are committed to serving as a resource 
for countries, states, cities, and individuals throughout the world.   
We welcome additions to and modifications of this report and 
analysis. To submit a change please email info@pathcheck.org
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